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made by X in person or by an agent who represents X and his associated
manufacturers.
It may be admitted that judgment should go against the defendant
in case he approached McLachlan with the purpose and intent of causing
the latter to break his contract with the plaintiff. In the instant case
no such purpose or intent was proved. Mere knowledge, however,
on the part of the defendant, that compliance with his request would
probably cause McLachlan to break his contract, is not enough to make
the defendant guilty of a tort. The defendant's duty to the plaintiff
is surely no greater than his duty to society, and it is well established
that one is privileged to sell goods to another even though he knows
that the buyer intends to make an illegal use of the goods.16 Thus
it has been held that it is not illegal to sell liquors to A merely because
the seller "knows" that A intends to use them in breach of the criminal
law; the sale to A not being in itself forbidden, it becomes unlawful
only when made by the seller "with a view" to its subsequent illegal
use by A.17
It seems, therefore, that the defendant was guilty of no breach of
the plaintiff's "property right in the contract." He had "just cause"
for his statement to McLachlan, such cause consisting in his desire
for economic advantages. Such cause may cease to be just and sufficient
if accompanied by a conscious purpose and intent to induce a breach
of contract. The defendant may have had such a purpose and may
have covertly threatened a strike s in order to attain this end; but
judgment should not go against him when there has been no finding
by the court that either fact existed.
A. L. C.
In People v. Gitlow (1922) 234 N. Y. 132, 136 N. E. 317, the New
York Court of Appeals had occasion to interpret and apply the state
statute making "advocacy of criminal anarchy" a felony. The statute
defines "criminal anarchy" as "the doctrine that organized government
should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination .... ,
or by any unlawful means." The defendant, a "left wing socialist,"
plainly advocated in print the overthrow of the existing government
in this country by the mass strike and the establishment in its place by
revolution of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The court wasted no time
on the question of the constitutionality of the statute; and the majority
16 This may not be true in case the illegal use is a crime of great magnitude,
such as murder; but it is true of misdemeanors, and it should be true in
cases of mere torts and breaches of contract.
'Graves v. Johnson (1892) 156 Mass. 211, 30 N. E. 8W8, (19Ol) 179 Mass.
53, 6o N. E. 383.
' That a "threat" to strike may be unlawful even though the strike itself
would not be, see Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation (19o7) 2o HARV.
L. REV. 253, 273.
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COMMENTS
of the court held that the defendant was properly convicted of the
felony therein defined. Pound and Cardozo, JJ., dissented on the
ground that what the defendant advocated was not "anarchy," inasmuch
as he proposed a substituted form of organized government. They did
not doubt that the defendant was guilty of advocating the use of illegal
means or that the "mass strike" necessarily involves the use of force.
The contention of the dissenting judges seems sound if we accept a
definition of anarchy that involves the permanent destruction of all
organized government; but it is submitted that the court would not
be justified in adopting such a definition. "Criminal anarchy" was
defined by the legislature; and it was advocacy of anarchy as thus
defined that was made a felony, not anarchy as defined by philosophers
and jurists. The legislature defined it as "the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrown by force." By the most reasonable
interpretation of this, it seems that the legislature made it a felony
to advocate the violent overthrow of organized government as it exists
now or at the time of such advocacy. The statute says nothing about
the sort of organization or disorganization that is to exist among the
ruins. It is not necessary, in order to approve the decision, to agree
with the majority of the court that a proletarian dictatorship is not an
organized government. We may grant it to be such. Were such a
statute in force in Russia, it would be "criminal anarchy" to advocate
the violent overthow of the present soviet government even though the
purpose is to establish a constitutional republic or a pure democracy
in its place. A revolutionist still has to bear the customary risks of
his profession.1
Now that a "sale" of a cable transfer of exchange has been defined
as an executory agreement for future action similar to a contract to
manufacture personalty for another,' the amount recoverable for a
failure to perform should no longer remain in doubt. Is the purchaser
entitled, beside his right to damages, to the alternative remedy of
rescission? The transaction should be distinguished from the sale of
a foreign draft2 which is subsequently dishonored. In such a case
the recovery is limited, in addition to interest and charges, to an amount
which would have purchased a good bill at the rate of exchange pre-
vailing at the date of dishonor.3 In ordinary contracts the plaintiff
may rescind after a substantial breach provided the status quo of the
'embership in the Industrial Workers of the World is per se a crime. People
v. Roe (1922, Calif. App.) 209 Pac.'381.
'Equitable Trust Co. v. Keewe (1922) 232 N. Y. 290, 133 N. E. 894.
' For the distinction between a purchase of a draft and of a cable transfer, see
COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 416.
'Suse v. Pompe (I86O, C. P.) 8 C. B. (N. s.) 537; Daniel, Negotiable Instrut-
inents (6th ed. 1913) sec. 1445. For a discussion of damages in the case of the
dishonor of foreign drafts, see COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 198.
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